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Abstract 
 
Questions about the perception and proper communication of risk are of increasing 
theoretical and practical interest.  An experiment examined how  the type and presentation 
format of information about investment options affected the expectations held by investors 
about asset risk, returns, and volatility.  Some respondents were provided with the names of 
investment options in addition to historical (1987-97) volatility data, and some were not.  
Historical volatility was presented either as a bar graph of returns per year or as a 
continuous density distribution of returns over the 10-year period.  Risk and volatility 
perceptions both varied significantly as a function of type and format of information, but in 
different ways.  Biases in risk perception, but not in volatility forecasts, affected portfolio 
decisions. 
 
1. Introduction 
Investment portfolio decisions are supposed to be a function of expected returns, variance 
and the covariance structure of the returns of all available investment alternatives. Markowitz 
(1952) showed how to optimally select assets for a portfolio, using these variables. The Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966) employed 
these variables in an equilibrium theory that allowed for asset pricing as well. 
Informational constraints or bounded rationality may prevent ordinary investors from 
considering correlations or covariances when making portfolio allocations.  However, at the very 
least, they should think about the expected return and likely variance of assets returns, or about 
other, more appropriate, measures of risk (Sarin & M. Weber, 1993; E.U. Weber, 1999)1.  This 
raises the question of how such investors might arrive at some expectation about the return and 
riskiness of assets, given the types of information usually available to them (e.g., provided by 
investment brokers, the internet, newspapers, or other news services).  One possibility is that 
people use the past performance of investment options to predict future performance, that is, that 
they use historical returns to estimate future returns and their likely volatility or risk. In this 
context, the format in which historical returns are presented might influence estimates of future 
performance.  Another possibility is that people use information such as macroeconomic indices, 
expected trends, or company-specific facts to arrive at expectations about the risks and returns of 
investment options. In this case, knowledge of the name of the investment becomes important, as 
the name indicates the type, market and other special characteristics of the asset. 
In this paper, we study the influence of these two types of information on people’s 
perceptions of investment options and their asset allocation.  We also examine how perception 
and allocation decisions were affected by the format in which information about historical 
performance is provided. In a between-subject design, we provided potential investors with 
information about the historical performance of sixteen investment alternatives, using two 
different presentation formats. In addition to (or instead of) the historical return data, some 
investors were also provided with the names or identity of these investment alternatives. We 
measured investors’ expectations of future returns as well as their volatility forecasts (i.e., the 
standard deviation of predicted returns) for the sixteen investment alternatives.  In addition to 
volatility forecasts, we also assessed investors’ perception of the riskiness of the investment 
 
options.  Finally, we elicited their portfolio decisions. These data allow us to examine the 
relationship between objective, historical volatility and either expected volatility or perceived 
riskiness of assets.  They also allow us to test which of these two expectations is a better 
predictor of portfolio choices in a risk—return framework.  
Researchers from several disciplines have been discussing different measures of risk and 
their ability to predict decisions under uncertainty in a risk—return framework (Keller, Sarin & 
M. Weber, 1986; E.U. Weber, 1988, 1999; Sarin & M. Weber, 1993; Brachinger & M. Weber, 
1997; Jia, Dyer, & Butler, 1999; Baz, et al., 1999).  Whereas the utility of separating risk 
perception and perceived-risk attitude in risk—return models of risky choice is well established 
(Highhouse & Yuce, 1996; E.U. Weber & Milliman, 1997), less is known about the effect that 
the type and format of investment information have on people’s perception of the options’ 
riskiness2.  In theory, format should not have any influence on investors’ risk behavior3.  But 
Unser (1999) found differences in judgments of the riskiness of hypothetical investment 
alternatives when participants were given past performance information in either charts of the 
historical asset prices or histograms of the historical returns.  Using a wide range of content 
domains, Ibrekk and Morgan (1987), on the other hand, found few systematic differences 
between the probability estimates of participants who had received information about stochastic 
variables in nine different presentation formats, including pie charts, histograms, boxplots, 
probability densities, and cumulative probabilities plots.  
Questions about the perception and proper communication of risk are also of increasing 
practical relevance.  In Germany, for example, banks and investment houses have recently been 
legally mandated to inform their clients about the risk of assets they intend to buy (WpHG 
No. 31(2)). In particular, they are required to inform investors about the past performance of 
assets, as well as special (e.g., industry-specific) risks.   The SEC in the U.S. has been 
contemplating similar regulations.  In this context, there is motivation to find out how type of 
information and presentation format influences investors’ perceptions of future risk and return, 
and how these perceptions influence portfolio decisions.  Financial institutions differ, for 
example, on whether past returns are shown as discrete values, in historical sequence by year, in 
a bar graph, or whether such information is presented as a continuous probability density 
function, using appropriate distributional assumptions.  Each presentation format highlights 
different aspects of the same past-return information (and the two formats are, in that sense, not 
 
entirely equivalent), but it is hard to argue that one format is more “appropriate” or more 
“honest” or “accurate” than the other in terms of informing investors about risk and returns.  
Choice between presentation formats needs, therefore, to be informed about empirical results 
about the way common investors react to different presentation formats of (essentially) 
equivalent information.  
Our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes an  experiment designed to answer 
these questions, conducted in Germany and the United States.  Section 3 proposes a model of 
volatility forecasts and risk perceptions. Section 4 presents the results of our study regarding the 
perception of expected returns, expected risk, and expected volatility, as well as their effects on 
portfolio choice.  Section 5 summarizes the insights and implications of our study. 
 
 
r 
2. Experiment 
120 business students from the United States (Ohio State University) and Germany 
(Universität Mannheim) were asked to fill out a questionnaire that provided them with a series of 
judgment and decision tasks, in return for a payment of $10 in the U.S. and 15 DM in Germany.  
The response rate was 58% in Germany and 64% in the U.S. The data of three respondents (one 
German and two Americans) were removed from the study, because their responses were 
incomplete. 
Participants were asked to imagine that they had inherited $30,000 (in Germany: 50,000 
DM) from a distant relative and were committed to invest this money for one year. A deck 
containing sixteen cards provided information about sixteen investment alternatives (listed in 
Appendix A) which differed in country of origin (Germany or U.S.) and in type (bonds, stocks, 
index funds, etc.).  The identity of the individual stocks was varied between-subjects.  Crossed 
with this manipulation, five between-subject information conditions had information cards that 
provided the following information about each investment (see Appendix B for examples): 
1. Condition N : Only the name of the investment, as shown in Appendix A. 
2. Condition R- :  The annual % returns4 of each investment for the years 1987-975 as a bar 
chart, without the name of the investment.  
3. Condition R+ : The annual % returns of each investment for the years 1987-97 as a bar 
chart as in R-, and the name of the investment. 
4. Condition D- :  A continuous distribution6 of annual % returns, estimated from the annual 
return data for the years 1987-97, without  the name of the investment.  
5. Condition D+ : A continuous distribution of annual % returns as in D-, and the name of the 
investment. 
Participants who were provided with the names of the available investments (conditions N, R+, 
D+) also got an information sheet that provided a description of the different types of assets.   
Participants first made three predictions about the value that a 100 DM/$100 investment 
in each investment alternative would have after one year: a prediction of the median value, of a 
lower bound (10%-percentile) and of an upper bound (90%-percentile).  They also rated (on a 
scale from 0 to 6) how competent they felt in making these predictions.  Participants then rated 
the risk of each investment (on a scale from 1 (no risk) to 9 (highest risk)) by sorting the 
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information cards representing the 16 investment options into three piles of low, intermediate, 
and high risk, and then further subdividing the cards in each of these three categories according 
to their riskiness.  Finally, respondents created an investment portfolio by selecting up to five 
investments and indicated the relative percentage of each for their portfolio. To control for order 
effects, we counterbalanced the order in which the German and American investment options 
were presented. The questionnaire closed by asking respondents about their income bracket, prior 
investment experience, and knowledge about finance.  They also rated their risk attitude as 
showing either “little”, “moderate” or “great tolerance for risk”. 
3. Modeling Volatility Forecasts and Perceived Risk 
The general structure of the regression models is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. They 
assume that investors’ volatility forecasts and perception of the riskiness of an asset derive from 
information about the asset’s historical volatility. To test the hypothesis that the format in which 
historical volatility information is provided influences investors’ volatility forecasts and risk 
perception, we allowed the regression coefficient for historical volatility to differ for the two 
information format conditions R and D.  Appropriate dummy variables also tested for an effect of 
having knowledge of the names of the assets and for an effect of the type of asset.  Finally, one 
variant of the models also included  investor-specific variables to control for our repeated-
measures design. 
[Insert Figure 1 here.] 
Volatility Forecasts 
Using  investor i’s stated median projected one-year return for each asset j (Y0.5ij), and the 
stated 10th and 90th percentile of possible returns (Y0.1ij and Y0.9ij), we calculated an estimate of 
respondents’ volatility forecasts (the projected standard deviation of one-year returns) by using 
the three-point approximation of Pearson and Tukey (see Keefer and Bodily (1983)): 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2ij29.0ij25.0ij21.0ijij mean100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0int)po(Vol −⋅+⋅+⋅=  (1) 
with mean .     (2) 100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0 9.0ij5.0ij1.0ijij ⋅+⋅+⋅=
2 
Historical volatility of asset j was computed as follows.  Assuming lognormal stock prices 
and using the historical data of the years 1987-97, we estimated the parameters µ  and σ  of the 
lognormal distribution and used them to compute the volatility and mean of the historical asset 
returns for a one-year horizon (t=1)7: 
( )1ee)hist(Vol tt2j 2 −⋅= ⋅σ⋅µ⋅   with  .    (3) tj e)hist(Mean ⋅µ=
Model V1 regresses investors’ volatility forecasts on each asset’s historical volatility, 
allowing for an information-format specific effect, and on dummy variables for different types of 
assets:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ij
Kk
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Parameters β , β(R) and β(D) describe the influence of historical volatility Vol(hist) on investors’ 
volatility forecasts. d  and  are dummy variables that indicate the format in which 
historical volatility information had been provided (as a continuous Distribution or as a bar graph 
of annual Returns): 
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Dummy variables  characterize asset-specific characteristics, as shown in Appendix C.  The 
are asset type specific regression coefficients, and the 
( )ijkd
( )kα ijε  are the residuals. 
Model V2 regresses volatility forecasts on historical volatility, again allowing for 
information-format effects, but also includes an investor-specific parameter, iδ , to control for the 
fact that the volatility forecasts in our repeated-measures design are not independent: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ijiiijij DDdRRd)hist(Volint)po(Vol ε+δ+β⋅+β⋅+β⋅=    (7) 
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To see whether knowledge of the name or type of investment asset—in addition to historical 
volatility information—affects investors’ volatility forecasts, we analyzed whether the investor-
specific parameters, iδ , differed for participants who were provided with the names (and thus the 
types) of the assets and those that were not.  Residuals ijε  were analyzed for asset-type specific 
effects. 
[Insert Figure 2 here.] 
Risk Perception 
The models of investors’ judgments of the riskiness of each investment, shown in Figure 
2, were modeled in essentially the same way as volatility forecasts, with the following 
differences.  We used the logarithm of the historical volatilities as predictors, as those provided a 
better fit.  Because of this, the parameters β(R) and β(D) of Model R1 are now additive 
constants:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ij
Kk
ijiijij kdkDDdRRd))hist(Vol100ln(  .constRP ε+⋅α+β⋅+β⋅+β⋅⋅+= ∑
∈
 (8) 
Model R2 again uses a two-step analysis, with the first step controlling for the repeated-
measures design by adding an investor-specific personal parameter, iδ , to the regression: 
( ) ijijij )hist(Vol100lnRP ε+δ+β⋅⋅=        (9) 
The second step analyzes these personal parameters for any effects of the format and type of 
information about the assets. In contrast to model V2, we tested for the format-specific effect of 
information here by comparing the investor-specific parameters, since we did not use the 
proportional parameters β(R) and β(D) in this logarithmic model.  Finally, we again analyzed the 
residuals for asset-type specific effects. 
 
4. Results 
Order Effects 
The order in which American and German assets were presented did not affect any of the 
respondents’ judgments in either country. 
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Perception of Expected Returns 
In classical risk-value models, expected return is typically modeled as the expected value 
of returns, based on past performance of the asset.  Our data allowed us to test this assumption.  
In particular, we investigated whether investors’ expectations of return were equal to the 
expected value of historical returns and whether they were influenced (a) by the format in which 
information about historical returns was provided and (b) by having information about the name 
and type of available assets, above and beyond their historical returns. 
Investors’ expectations of asset returns (per dollar or DM invested) were estimated as 
.    To compare investors’ expectations of 
asset returns to the expected value based on historical returns, we used the following logarithmic 
measure
100/Y3.0100/Y4.0100/Y3.0mean 9.0ij
5.0
ij
1.0
ijij ⋅+⋅+⋅=
8: 
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and calculated an average mean bias for each investor, i: 
∑
=
=
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The term “bias” in this context is used simply used a label for systematic deviations of 
future expected returns from past historic returns.  No other connotation (e.g, of “irrationality”) is 
intended, as it may well be rational under certain circumstances for (individual) expectations 
about the future to differ from historic levels.   As shown in Table 1, expectations about asset 
returns closely resembled historical expected values, i.e., biases were close to zero.  Kruskal-
Wallis tests for the German (p=0.416) and the U.S. data (p=0.266) showed that there was no 
significant information-format effect on investors’ mean bias in the perception of the expected 
returns.  Knowledge of the asset names introduced only a few asset-specific effects, i.e., mean 
biases that were different from 0 at the .05 level of significance.  In particular, the returns of 
stocks of lesser-known companies were underestimated relative to historical returns (German 
data: Henninger Bräu, -11.1%; Krom Schröder, -11.6%; Bethlehem Steel, -9.8%; US data: 
Henninger Bräu, -19.1%; Krom Schröder, -4.8%) and those of better-known or more frequently 
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discussed companies were overestimated (German data: Bayer, +7.53%; US data: Boeing, 
+5.33%).  In both data sets,  average returns of stock index funds were overestimated by 2%-4% 
and returns of German bonds were underestimated by 2%-3%. 
[Insert Table 1 here.] 
Volatility Forecasts 
Model V1—German Data.  As shown in Appendix D, model V1 predicted the volatility 
forecasts of German investors quite well, accounting for 53.6% of the total variance.  Volatility 
forecasts had a non-zero (5%) intercept and a regression coefficient for historical volatility of less 
than one.  Given that historical volatility is undoubtedly an imperfect predictor of future 
volatility, investors seem to have appropriately regressed their predictions towards the mean, as 
shown in Figure 3.  The format in which historical volatility information had been provided 
strongly affected investors’ volatility forecasts, with respondents in the D-conditions (with a 
density distribution of 1 year return data) forecasting additional volatility compared to the grand 
mean (β(D)=0.20, p=0.000) and respondents in the R-conditions (with a bar graph of annual 
return data plotted for each year in order) forecasting less volatility (β(R)= -0.15, p=0.000).  
There were several asset-specific effects. The volatility forecasts of foreign bonds was lower than 
those of other assets (after controlling for their historical volatility) (α(US-bonds)=-0.07, 
p=0.000), probably due to an underestimate of  exchange rate risk, which is the main part of the 
risk of foreign bonds. Consistent with this interpretation, the dummy variable for U.S. bonds was 
significantly lower than that for German bonds.  There was some evidence of a home bias (Kilka 
& M. Weber, 1997). While the volatility forecasts of foreign index funds were not different from 
those of other assets, the volatility of the domestic stock index fund was estimated to be lower 
(α(GER-stocks)=-0.05, p=0.001).  Finally, forecasts of the volatility of investments on credit 
were lower than those of other assets (α(investment on credit)=-0.10, p=0.000). 
[Insert Figure 3 here.] 
Model V1—U.S. Data.  Model V1 accounted for 27.4% of the total variance of the 
volatility forecasts of the American investors.  Volatility forecasts again had a non-zero (12%) 
intercept and a regression coefficient for historical volatility of less than one (β=0.44, p=0.000), 
showing even stronger evidence of regression towards the mean. Just as in the German data, 
investors in the D-conditions tended to forecast greater volatility than investors who had seen the 
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same historical return information in the R-condition format (β(D)=0.16, p=0.003; (β(R)=-0.11, 
p=0.046).  Volatility of both German and U.S. bonds was estimated as lower than that of other 
assets, after controlling for historical volatility.  
Model V2—German Data.  Similar to the results for Model V1, presenting historical asset 
volatility as a density distribution resulted in significantly higher volatility forecasts than 
presentation of the same historical returns in an annual return bar chart. The β coefficient was 
less than one (β=0.459, p=0.000) and β(D) was significantly greater than zero (β(D)=0.297, 
p=0.000), while β(R) was not.  To examine the effect of knowing the names of the assets on 
volatility forecasts, we compared the iδ  of investors who were provided with the names of the 
assets (conditions D+, R+ and N) with those of investors who were not (conditions D- and R-).  
For the former group (n=43),  averaged 0.03; for the latter group (n=26), the average iδ iδ  was 
0.07, a difference that was nearly significant on a 5%-level (p=0.054) by a Mann-Whitney test.  
Knowing the name of the assets decreased investors’ estimates of future volatility.  Analysis of 
the residuals εij for asset-specific effects confirmed the results of model V1.  Forecasts of the 
volatility of bonds (and especially foreign bonds) was judged to be lower than that of other assets 
(α(US-bonds)=-0.04, p=0.000).   There was again evidence of a home bias, with U.S. stock 
indices receiving significantly greater volatility forecasts (α(US-stocks)=0.054; p=0.000). 
Forecasts of the volatility of investments on credit were also again lower (α(investment on 
credit)=-0.061, p=0.000).   
Model V2—U.S. Data.  Just as for the German data, presenting historical asset volatility 
as a density distribution resulted in higher volatility forecasts than presentation of the same 
historical returns in an annual return bar graph. β was less than one (β=0.40, p=0.000) and β(D) 
was greater than zero (β(D)=0.20, p=0.002), while β(R) was not.  Comparing the personal 
constants for investors who were or were not provided with the names of the investments, we 
again found a slightly smaller average iδ  for the first group (0.10) than for the second group 
(0.11), though the difference was not significant (p=0.276).   Examination of the asset-specific 
effects showed that estimates of the volatility of both German and U.S. bonds were lower than 
that of other assets (α(GER-bonds)=-0.027, p=0.024 and α(US-bonds)=-0.035, p=0.003).  
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Visual Summary.  To illustrate the information condition effects on volatility forecasts 
described in this section, we standardized investors’ volatility forecasts in the same way we 
standardized their return expectations, i.e., by dividing forecasts by historical levels9: 



=
j
ij
ij )hist(Vol
int)po(Vol
ln)bias(Vol ,        (12) 
and calculating an average volatility bias Vol(bias)ij for each investor: 
∑
=
=
16
1j
iji )bias(Vol16
1)bias(Vol .        (13) 
Figure 4 plots average volatility bias as a function of information condition for German 
and American respondents.  The left panel shows that German investors tended to provide future 
volatility estimates that were significantly lower than historical volatility.  Volatility forecasts 
differed as a function of the information condition.  The median volatility bias for respondents 
who were just provided with the name and type-description of the sixteen assets (condition N) 
was -.65, i.e., investors provided volatility forecasts that were smaller than historic volatility.  
The median bias was -.34 for participants who received only the bar graph of historical returns 
over the past ten years, without knowing the name or type of the underlying assets (condition R-). 
The median bias (i.e., underestimation) was even larger (-.71) when these two types of 
information were combined (condition R+). Participants who were provided with only historic 
volatility information as a density distribution (condition D-), on the other hand, gave volatility 
forecasts that were larger than historic volatility, i.e., had a median bias of  +.09.  Knowing also 
the name and type of the assets (condition D+) again resulted in lower volatility forecasts, for a 
median bias of -.24. In general, volatility forecasts were greater when historic volatility 
information came in the form of a density function, which focuses attention on extreme outcomes 
which are visually more prominent in this presentation format. That is, investors in the D-
condition may have paid too much attention to possible extreme values, while ignoring their low 
probability of occurrence.  A Kruskal-Wallis test rejected the null-hypothesis that the forecast 
biases under the five information-conditions were equal (p=0.006). In a Mann-Whitney U test, 
differences between pairs of conditions were significant for N/D- (p=0.006), R-/D- (p=0.008), 
R+/D- (p=0.001) and R+/D+ (p=0.049). 
[Insert Figure 4 here.] 
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The right panel of Figure 4 shows the average volatility forecast biases of American 
investors, which differed from those of German investors in absolute, but not relative, terms. 
American investors tended to overestimate volatility forecasts across all 16 investment assets, 
perhaps because the historical volatility in the United States from 1987 to 1997 was lower than 
volatility in Germany.  When comparing forecast bias in the five information conditions, we find 
similar results as for the German data. Again the R conditions lead to a lower perception of 
volatility than the D conditions. R+ and N again lead to the most negative bias (medians of -.19 
and -.15) and condition D- to the most positive bias (median of +.22).  A Kruskal-Wallis test of  
differences between conditions was again significant (p=0.013). A Mann-Whitney U-test showed 
that differences between pairs of conditions were significant for R-/R+ (p=0.050), R-/D- 
(p=0.009), R+/D- (p=0.000) and R+/D+ (p=0.044). 
Risk Perception 
 Model R1—German Data.  Model R1 accounted for 68.8% of the variance in the 
judgments of perceived riskiness of investment assets by German respondents. As shown in 
Appendix E, most of the predictor variables were significant10.  Estimated model parameters 
were reasonable, with a constant of -3.15 and a β of 2.67, for example, predicting that an 
investment with a historical volatility of 4.73% would be classified as having "no risk" (PR=1). 
The maximum risk category ("highest risk", PR=9) would be reached with a historical volatility 
of 94.67%. The historical volatilities calculated in Deutschmark in our study range from 5.73% to 
55.24%, which correspond to risk ratings of PR=1.51 and PR=7.56.  Just as for the volatility 
forecasts, there was a significant tendency to rate asset risks higher in the D-conditions that 
provided investors with estimated density functions of historic returns (β(D)=0.332, p=0.007). 
Different from the volatility forecasts, there was a weaker but significant tendency to also rate 
assets higher in risk in the R-conditions, where historical returns of the years 1987 to 1997 were 
provided as a bar graph (β(R)=0.287, p=0.025), relative to the N-condition.  Examination of the 
asset-specific effects confirmed our hypothesis that exchange rate risk were underestimated, as 
the risk of American bonds was rated significantly lower than that of other assets (α(US-
bonds)=-1.192, p=0.000), again controlling for historical volatility. There also was evidence of a 
home bias in risk perceptions.  The risk of German stocks was judged to be significantly lower 
than that of other assets (α(GER-stocks)=-0.891, p=0.000), while the risk of U.S. stocks was not 
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significantly different.  Just as for the volatility forecasts, there was a tendency to underestimate 
diversification effects, by judging the risks of mixed portfolios to be higher than that of other 
assets ((α(portfolios)=0.454 p=0.001). 
Model R1—U.S. Data.  Model R1 accounted for 52.3% of the variance of the risk 
judgments of American respondents.  Model parameters (a constant of -2.88 and a β of 2.80) 
were such that the lowest historical volatility calculated in U.S. dollar of 5.41% corresponded to 
a perceived risk of PR=1.84 and the highest volatility of 54.98% to PR=8.34.  Perceived risk did 
not differ significantly as a function of information condition.  The risk of U.S. bonds was judged 
to be lower than that of other assets (α(US-bonds)=-0.568, p=0.009), while the risk of German 
bonds was not significantly different, probably because of the extraordinary low historical 
volatility of the German bonds calculated in U.S. dollar. While not significant, there was a trend 
in the direction of a home bias for stocks. The risk of mixed portfolios was again significantly 
larger than average (α(portfolios)=0.639, p=0.000). 
Model R2—German Data.  Model R2, designed to control for the repeated-measures 
design of our study, yielded essentially the same results as model R1.  Figure 5 provides the 
mean of investors’ personal parameters, iδ , in the five information conditions. Participants who 
knew the names of the assets (conditions N, R+ and D+) perceived less risk (i.e., had more 
negative iδ ’s) than participants who only had statistical information about the historical returns 
(conditions R- and D-)  (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.026).  Especially the group that had only the 
name of the assets (condition N) perceived asset risks to be low.  Furthermore, risk perceptions 
were higher for participants who were provided only with the estimated density functions 
(condition D-) than for participants who were provided only with the historical returns bar graph 
(conditions R-).  Analysis of the residuals ijε  (in conditions N, R+ and D+) for asset-specific 
effects showed the same effects as model R1: risk perception was lower for U.S. bonds (α(US-
bonds)=-0.832, p=0.000) and German stocks (α(GER-stocks)=-0.524, p=0.000), and higher for 
portfolios  (α(portfolios)=0.457, p=0.000). 
Model R2—U.S. Data.  The results of model R2 again confirmed those of model R1. 
Knowing assets names resulted in lower perceptions of risk, just as in the German data.  While an 
omnibus Kruskal-Wallis test of differences between information conditions was not significant 
(p=0.396), investors in conditions that informed them of asset names had marginally more 
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negative personal constants iδ than investors in the other conditions (Mann-Whitney U test: 
p=0.068). The asset-specific results described above were also confirmed (α(US-bonds)=-0.482, 
p=0.014; (α(portfolios)=0.568, p=0.003). 
[Insert Figure 5 here.] 
Summary of Perceptions of Future Return, Volatility, and Risk 
While investors’ perception of expected returns were not affected by information 
conditions, type and format of information clearly influenced their perceptions of future volatility 
and asset risk.  Providing historical return information in the form of an estimated density 
function rather than as a bar graph of annual returns led to greater estimates of volatility and risk, 
consistent with the results of Ibrekk and Morgan (1987).  Knowledge of the name and type of 
assets, on the other hand, led to lower estimates of volatility and risk.  Differences in the format 
in which historical volatility information was provided had a larger impact on volatility forecasts 
than risk perception, whereas knowledge of name and thus type of assets had a larger effect on 
risk perception. 
Our results regarding the effects of information format on volatility forecasts and risk are 
consistent with Raghubir and Das’ (1999, p. 64f) hypothesis that “decision makers may be prone 
(...) to initial anchoring.  Decision makers sample from an information distribution; the points 
that are most perceptually salient (such as the end-points of the distribution) are the most likely to 
be selected as initial anchors in the decision process.”   The density distributions of the D-
conditions of our experiment made extreme values far more salient than the bar graphs of the R-
conditions, resulting in greater estimates of asset risk and especially volatility.   
The home bias hypothesis (Kilka & M. Weber, 1997) predicts that volatility and risk of 
foreign assets should be judged to be higher than that of domestic assets.  This prediction was 
confirmed only for stocks. For bonds, we found the opposite results for German investors, who 
provided lower estimates of the risk and volatility of U.S. bonds than German bonds, probably 
because exchange rate risk (which is the major risk of foreign bonds) was underestimated. We 
did not find this result in the U.S. data, probably because of the amazingly low historical 
volatility of German bonds (calculated in U.S. dollar).  In both countries, we found clear 
evidence that investors underestimated the risk-reducing effect of diversification. A dummy 
variable that tested for such an effect (encoding international portfolios and bond/stock-
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portfolios) was positive for the regressions of volatility forecasts and significantly positive for 
those of risk perceptions.  
Raghubir and Das (1999, p. 62) demand that models of information processing ought to 
“include the stages of perception of existing information, retrieval of information from memory, 
and integration of multiple sources of information.”  Our experimental manipulations and models 
described above successfully separated and integrated perceptual biases resulting from the format 
in which statistical information about historical returns (existing information) was provided and 
memory biases that were driven by knowledge of asset names and types (which allowed the use 
of information from memory).   
Information format and prior knowledge about asset types affected volatility forecasts and 
risk perceptions in similar but not identical ways.  The correlation between volatility forecasts 
and perceived risk was .57 (p<0.0001) for the German data and .45 (p<0.0001) for the U.S. data, 
confirming that volatility forecasts and perceived risk are related but not identical constructs.   
Explaining Asset Choices  
To examine the effect of investors’ expectations about asset risk, volatility, and return on 
their portfolio decisions, we compared the ability of six variants of a risk-return model to predict 
asset choices.  For each investor, we tested investor’s belief about the risks and returns  of the 16 
available assets as a function of their decision to select or not to select the assets for their 
portfolio.  Belief about risk was operationalized in one of three ways as: (a) assets’ historical 
volatility, (b) the investor’s volatility forecast, or (c) the investor’s perceived risk judgment.  
Belief about return was operationalized in one of two ways as: (a) historical expected return, or 
(b) the investor’s return expectation (see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
Comparing the fit of risk—return models that differed in their operationalization of risk, 
we found that the models that used either historical volatility or investors’ forecast of future 
volatility did not predict observed asset choices nearly as well as the models that used investors’ 
judgments of perceived risk. This result confirms previous demonstrations of the fact that 
variance-based risk measures as used, for example, in the Markowitz (1952) model, are worse 
than subjective risk assessments in describing portfolio decisions (E.U. Weber, 1997, 1999; E.U. 
Weber & Hsee, 1998)11. 
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These results are confirmed and visually illustrated by comparing the residuals of models 
V2 and R2 (that controlled for historical volatility and information format effects) for assets in 
two groups: residuals of assets that had been chosen by the investor versus residuals of assets 
that had not been chosen.  Figure 6 shows the median residuals of model V2 (i.e., of the 
regression of investors’ volatility forecasts) for both chosen and non-chosen assets.   These 
residual show that volatility forecasts are not a good predictor of asset choice in either the 
German data (left panel) or the U.S. data (right panel).  For both groups, the residuals indicate 
that the judged volatility of chosen assets was, in fact, higher than the judged volatility of non-
chosen assets, which would suggest a dubious asset-selection rule. 
[Insert Figure 6 here.] 
The story is different for the relationship between investors’ perceptions of asset risk and 
asset selection.  Figure 7 shows the median residuals of model R2 (i.e., of the regression of 
investors’ asset risk judgments) for both chosen and non-chosen assets.   These residual show 
that risk perception is related to asset choice in a sensible way, with the risks of chosen assets 
judged to be lower than the risks of non-chosen assets. 
[Insert Figure 7 here.] 
Even though there was relatively little bias in investors’ perceptions of expected returns, 
as discussed earlier, perceived expected return still explained asset choices better than historical 
expected returns, though only significantly so for the German data.  Figure 8 illustrates this in its 
plot of the residuals of the regression of perceived asset returns on historical returns, for both 
chosen and non-chosen assets.  The residuals show that investors had higher return expectations 
for chosen assets than for non-chosen assets, consistent with the notion that they used their 
(biased) return expectations in their asset selection. 
[Insert Figure 8 here.] 
In summary, subjective perceived asset risk and subjective  expectations of  asset returns 
provided the best prediction of asset choices within a risk—value framework for investors in 
both countries.  Given that our study identified a number of ways in which both perceptions of 
returns and perceptions of risk were biased in systematic ways, we can make predictions about 
biases in asset allocation that should be expected as a consequence.  As discussed earlier, returns 
were expected to be higher for better-known or more frequently discussed stocks than for stocks 
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with less name-recognition, predicting that such stocks should be more frequently selected.  This 
prediction was confirmed in our data and is also found in real financial markets.   
Risk perception, on the other hand and as discussed above, was affected by the format in 
which historical volatility information was provided, with asset risk judged to be greater in the 
D-conditions.  This bias in risk perception also resulted in differences in asset allocation.  In 
general, there were fewer differences in asset allocation between experimental conditions than in 
risk and volatility expectations, most likely because investors do not apply risk—value models 
(or even simpler, more descriptive versions) in the appropriate way.  Instead, investors have 
been shown to engage in naive diversification (Benartzi & Thaler, 1998; Siebenmorgen & M. 
Weber, 2000).  The results of our study also show that investors do  not fully understand the 
effect of diversification on risk.  It is also likely that investors selected assets using rules that 
compared relative, rather than absolute, levels of risk and return.  If so, then biases in perceived 
risk and returns would not affect asset allocations in our study that varied type and format of 
asset information in a between-subject design.  Future studies may want to vary the type and 
format of asset information in a within-subject design.  
Our data suggest that asset allocation decisions were driven by risk and return 
expectations, rather than the other way around.  While we found strong effects of type and format 
of asset information on risk perception and volatility forecasts, information-driven effects on 
asset selection were much weaker.  Secondly, while volatility forecasts and risk perceptions were 
significantly correlated and risk perceptions and asset choices were significantly correlated, 
volatility forecasts and asset choices were not.  If reports of perceived asset risk were the result of 
portfolio decisions (rather than the other way around), we should not find either of these two 
patterns of results.  
In their own assessment of risk attitude (as showing “little”, “moderate” or “great” 
tolerance for risk), most respondents chose the “moderate”-option. Using a Kruskal-Wallis test, 
we found that differences in self-assessment of risk-attitude predicted differences in risk 
perception for the American investors.  Investors who characterized themselves as having greater 
tolerance for risk tended to report lower levels of perceived risk (i.e., had lower personal 
constants iδ in model R2) (p=0.006), consistent with the result that apparent differences in risk 
attitude are often the result of differences in risk perception, rather than attitude towards risk as it 
is perceived (E.U. Weber & Milliman, 1997; E.U. Weber, 2001).  
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Finally, there was no relationship between the number of finance courses respondents had 
taken at their university or their actual investment experience and their judgments and asset 
selections in our experiment. 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
Determinants of Asset Choices 
The results of our study can be summarized as a mixture of “good news” and “bad news.”  
On the positive side, investors’ asset allocation decisions clearly utilized information about 
historical volatility and mean historical returns of assets.  However, expectations of future asset 
returns and especially asset risk were biased in systematic ways as a function of factors that 
should not have had any effect (e.g., presentation format of historical returns) and failed to be 
influenced by factors that should have had an effect (e.g., diversification).  Our results also show 
that perceived asset risk is not synonymous with expected volatility and that it is perceived risk, 
rather than expected volatility, that determines asset selection.  A summary of these results is 
provided in Figure 9. 
[Insert Figure 9 here.] 
Proper Risk Perception and Risk Communication 
Our results confirm the importance of the ongoing discussion about the correct measure of 
perceived risk mentioned in the introduction.  They provide some insights about possible 
extensions of current models of risk to account for perceptual biases that are driven by attributes 
other than just the probability distribution of a single dimension (E.U. Weber, 1988, p. 201), e.g., 
historical returns.  Our study shows that, in the financial asset domain, people’s risk 
perceptions—among other things—show evidence of a home bias, underestimate exchange rate 
risks and underestimate diversification effects. 
The results of our study also illustrate that legal mandates about the proper 
communication of asset risks need to consider not only the type of asset information with which 
financial institutions should provide potential investors, but also the format of any such 
information, e.g., historical returns.  Given that nominally equivalent presentation formats lead to 
different impressions of asset risks, which translate into differences in investment behavior, and 
given that no gold standard exists to indicate a correct level of perceived risk, policy makers need 
15 
to realize that decisions about the appropriate content and format of financial risk communication 
cannot be made in an objective or value-free fashion.  
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Appendix 
A. Available Investments in our Study 
 
Inv. No. condition A1 condition A2 
1 German Government bonds (TTM12 5 years) 
2 German Government bonds (TTM 10 years) 
3 Mannesmann Bayer 
4 Henninger Bräu Krom Schröder 
5 DAX (German Stock Index) 
6 DAX on credit 
7 50/50 portfolio of DAX and German bonds 
8 U.S. Government bonds (TTM 5 years) 
9 U.S. Government bonds (TTM 10 years) 
10 McDonalds Boeing 
11 Halliburton Bethlehem Steel 
12 S&P 500 (U.S. Stock Index) 
13 S&P 500 on credit 
14 50/50 portfolio of S&P 500 and U.S. bonds 
15 50/50 portfolio of S&P 500 and DAX 
16 50/50 portfolio of German and U.S. bonds 
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B. Information about Investment Returns 
Example for conditions D+ 
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18 
C. Definition of asset-specific dummy variables: 
 
Investment no. 
d(k)ij 
1              2 3
(A1)
3 
(A2)
4 
(A1)
4 
(A2)
5 6 7 8 9 10
(A1)
10 
(A2)
11 
(A1)
11 
(A2)
12 13 14 15 16
GER-bonds 1 1 0      0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 
US-bonds          0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0      0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 ½ 
GER-stocks       0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 ½ 0         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ½ 0 
US-stocks                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 ½ ½ 0 
Mannesmann 0 0 1 0                 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bayer    0 0 0 1 0                0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Henninger Bräu     0 0 0 0 1 0               0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Krom Schröder      0 0 0 0 0 1 0              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mc Donalds            0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0        0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Boeing             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0       0 0 0 0 0 0
Halliburton              0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0      0 0 0 0 0
Bethlehem Steel 0 0 0 0           0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0     0 0 0 0
investment on credit 0       0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0
portfolios         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0        0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
N.B.:  The asset-specific dummy variables are only 1 or ½ if the participant j knows the name of the assets (conditions N, R+ and D+) 
otherwise (conditions R- and D-) the dummy variable is always 0. 
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D. Results of model V1 
German data: 
(R2=53.6%) 
Coefficientsa
.0496 .0104 4.769 .000
.6714 .0458 14.651 .000
.2000 .0352 5.683 .000
-.1454 .0363 -4.010 .000
-.0351 .0154 -2.286 .022
-.0676 .0145 -4.668 .000
-.0538 .0163 -3.296 .001
.0207 .0165 1.251 .211
-.1777 .0287 -6.198 .000
.0458 .0279 1.642 .101
-.1958 .0291 -6.720 .000
-.0068 .0287 -.239 .811
-.0855 .0267 -3.208 .001
.0475 .0280 1.698 .090
-.0846 .0267 -3.162 .002
.0367 .0286 1.286 .199
-.1022 .0208 -4.916 .000
.0152 .0123 1.232 .218
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Vol(his)a. 
 
U.S. data: 
(R2=27.4%) 
Coefficientsa
.1161 .0095 12.172 .000
.4405 .0629 7.004 .000
.1639 .0543 3.021 .003
-.1105 .0552 -2.001 .046
-.0391 .0164 -2.378 .018
-.0474 .0166 -2.857 .004
-.0075 .0186 -.401 .688
-.0175 .0189 -.926 .355
-.0232 .0405 -.573 .567
.0533 .0274 1.944 .052
-.1250 .0440 -2.844 .005
.0068 .0297 .230 .818
.0019 .0395 .048 .962
.0516 .0284 1.816 .070
.0383 .0396 .968 .333
-.0171 .0298 -.576 .565
.0225 .0219 1.025 .305
.0194 .0145 1.343 .179
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: Vol(his)a. 
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E. Results of model R1 
German data: 
(R2 = 68.8%) 
Coefficientsa
-3.1460 .3179 -9.897 .000
2.6692 .0938 28.462 .000
.3315 .1236 2.683 .007
.2865 .1274 2.248 .025
-.2361 .1845 -1.280 .201
-1.1924 .1574 -7.576 .000
-.8910 .1774 -5.021 .000
-.1906 .1753 -1.087 .277
-1.4971 .3005 -4.982 .000
.0693 .3078 .225 .822
-.4338 .3023 -1.435 .152
.4731 .3074 1.539 .124
-.1365 .2871 -.475 .635
.1206 .3013 .400 .689
.5682 .2950 1.926 .054
.9796 .3065 3.196 .001
-.0357 .2063 -.173 .863
.4536 .1319 3.438 .001
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: RPa. 
 
U.S. data: 
(R2=52.3%) 
Coefficientsa
-2.8836 .3384 -8.521 .000
2.8004 .1020 27.464 .000
.1462 .1734 .843 .399
.1167 .1762 .662 .508
-.0658 .2069 -.318 .750
-.5683 .2171 -2.618 .009
-.2287 .2338 -.978 .328
-.3195 .2341 -1.365 .173
-1.5983 .5032 -3.176 .002
-.2369 .3440 -.689 .491
-1.8406 .5157 -3.569 .000
-.6149 .3597 -1.710 .088
.5315 .4926 1.079 .281
-1.5614 .3528 -4.426 .000
.2126 .4952 .429 .668
-1.0287 .3599 -2.858 .004
-.2538 .2704 -.939 .348
.6385 .1817 3.515 .000
(Constant)
beta
beta (D)
beta (R)
alpha (GER-bonds)
alpha (US-bonds)
alpha (GER-stocks)
alpha (US-stocks)
alpha (Mannesmann)
alpha (Bayer)
alpha (Henninger Bräu)
alpha (Krom Schröder)
alpha (McDonalds)
alpha (Boeing)
alpha (Halliburton)
alpha (Bethlehem Steel)
alpha (investment on credit)
alpha (portfolios)
Model
1
B Std. Error
Unstandardized
Coefficients
t Sig.
Dependent Variable: RPa. 
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F. Significance of the Results 
 
Volatility Forecasts Risk Perception 
German data 
(one year) 
U.S. data 
(one year) 
German data 
(one year) 
U.S. data 
(one year) 
 
V1        V2 V1 V2 R1 R2 R1 R2
constant>0 ✔  ✔       
β<1 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔     
β(D)> β(R) ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 9  9  
β(D)>0 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  9  
β(R)<0 ✔ 9 ✔ 9 ✖  ✕  
 
Information-
driven 
results 
names lead to underestimation  9 
p=0.054 
 9  ✔  9 
p=0.068 
bonds underestimated ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 9 
α(foreign bonds)< α(domestic bonds) ✔ ✔ ✕ ✕ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ 
α(foreign stocks)> α(domestic stocks) ✔ ✔ 9 9 ✔ ✔ 9 9 
α(investments on credit)<0 ✔ ✔ ✕ ✕ 9 9 9 9 
 
Asset-
specific 
results 
α(portfolios)>0 9 9 9 9 ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
 
shadowed fields = evaluation not possible; V1/R1 = Method 1 ("ordinary" regression), V2/R2 = Method 2 (two-step regression 
considering the participant-specific dependency in the data); ✔ = significant result (p<0.05), 9 = found but not significant, ✕ = not 
found, ✖ = not found and opposite is significant (p<0.05) 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Modelling Volatility Forecasts 
 
Type of statistical information 
linear factor β 
historical volatility 
volatility forecast 
asset-specific constants α(⋅) 
participant-specific constants δi
perception bias β(D), β(R)
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Figure 2: Modelling Risk Perception 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of statistical information 
linear factor β
ln(historical volatility) 
risk perception 
asset-specific constants α(⋅) 
participant-specific constants δi 
perception bias
β(D), β(R) 
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Figure 3: Historical and Perceived Volatilties 
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Figure 4: Volatility Forecasts 
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Figure 5: Risk Perception 
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Figure 6: Effects of Biases in Volatility Forecasts on Investment Decisions 
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Figure 7: Effects of Biases in Risk Perception on Investment Decisions 
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Figure 8: Effects of Biases in Return Perception on Investment Decisions 
asset chosen ?
yesno
M
ed
ia
n 
R
es
id
ua
l o
f R
eg
re
ss
io
n
,010
,008
,006
,004
,002
,000
-,002
-,004
-,006
 asset chosen ?
yesno
M
ed
ia
n 
R
es
id
ua
l o
f R
eg
re
ss
io
n
,002
0,000
-,002
-,004
-,006
-,008
 
            German data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.000)     U.S. data (Mann-Whitney U test: p=0.060) 
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Figure 9: Dependencies in the Investment Decision Process 
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Table 1: Perception of Expected Returns 
( )j)bias(MeanAverage   
main conditions 
German participants U.S. participants 
N -.012 +.038 
R- -.023 +.016 
R+ +.001 +.010 
D- -.023 -.008 
D+ -.025 +.008 
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Table 2: Fit of risk-value models 
(a) historical expected return (b) investors’ return 
expectations 
German data U.S. data German data U.S. data 
 
Z p Z p Z p Z p 
(a) assets’ historical volatility -2.52 0.012 -5.84 0.000 -4.04 0.000 -4.44 0.000
(b) investors’ volatility forecasts -2.31 0.021 -0.87 0.386 -3.73 0.000 -1.39 0.170
(c) investors’ risk judgements -6.69 0.000 -6.44 0.000 -6.83 0.000 -5.43 0.000
Z- and p-value result from a Mann-Whitney U test, which tests the difference between the exemplary 
performance measures return-1.0·volatility (first two rows) and return-0.05·risk (last row) depending on 
the investment decision. 
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Footnotes 
                                                 
1 We will not consider any liquidity constraints here. 
2 Bull, Stone & Sieck (1998) examine the influence of different graphical presentations on perceived risk. 
3 In theory the type of information certainly has an impact. 
4 For the German questionnaires we used historical data calculated in Deutschmarks; for the U.S. 
questionnaires the data was calculated in U.S. dollars. 
5 We compared the 10-year data with 30-year data and did not find major differences. 
6 For the German questionnaires, we assumed the returns to be normal. For the American questionnaires, 
we assumed the returns to be lognormal.  
7 See Hull (1993), chapter 10.2 
8 We use this logarithmic measure to make sure that overestimations and underestimations are weightened 
equally. Alternatively we used a linear measure like Mean  and we get 
qualitatively similar results. 
1
)hist(Mean
mean
)bias(
i
ij
ij −=
9  Again we find similar results using a linear measure. 
10 We also evaluated model R1 using an ordered probit analysis and got qualitatively similar results. 
11 Psychological literature (Wells, 1992; O. Huber, Wider & O.W. Huber, 1997; Windschitl & Wells, 
1998) also describes the tendency that people do not base their decisions under uncertainty on information 
about probabilities. 
12 Time to maturity 
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